The Not Very United Kingdom: Growing Devolution and Nationalist Movements in the UK

Introduction

In the past decade, the UK has had seven prime ministers and a decade filled with political instability. This instability was compounded by post-Brexit and post-COVID economic problems, and dissatisfaction with the establishment parties grew. As an outcome of this dissatisfaction, the Tories’ rule since David Cameron came to an end with the growing instability of the May, Johnson, Truss and Sunak years. In the 2024 elections, the Labour Party had a landslide victory. Starmer’s government struggled from the outset. By-election defeats, a series of policy U-turns, and internal Labour criticism over issues including defence spending steadily eroded his authority. His failure to contain the rise of anti-establishment parties, most notably Nigel Farage’s Reform UK, ultimately left him under pressure from his own party to resign.

Following his resignation, the long-time mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, became the seventh prime minister of the UK. One of his stances was power devolution: taking power away from Westminster and Whitehall and giving it to local governments, to municipalities and even to the nations.

Giving more powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland may be designed to keep the union together, but it could just as easily fuel the nationalist movements it is meant to contain. This is the central paradox Burnham will have to answer.

What is Devolution and What is No 10 North?

Devolution in the UK is the process of transferring power from the central government to the local governments and nations of the UK. In its current form, devolution began around the time of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Prior to the Good Friday Agreement, in September 1997, there were referendums in Scotland and Wales that approved the creation of devolved bodies.

The UK, as a unitary state, has one sovereign parliament at Westminster alongside three devolved legislative bodies: the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Senedd of Wales. On the executive side, the UK Government sits alongside the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive. The UK Parliament is the sovereign law-making body of the UK. Each nation has its own devolution settlement, within which it can make laws on devolved matters in place of the UK government. Reserved matters, including defence, immigration and most welfare policy, remain under Westminster’s authority regardless of devolution settlements.

Within England, the term devolution is also regularly used for devolution to local governments. According to the UK Cabinet Office’s factsheet on devolution, the only difference is that English devolution does not include law-making and tax-raising powers. Following the Labour victory in late 2024, the newly elected government formed the Council of the Nations and Regions and the Mayoral Council for England. In April 2026, the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act received Royal Assent. This Act transfers more power to strategic authorities and local authorities in England.

Burnham’s own contribution to the devolution agenda as prime minister has centred on No 10 North. During the Labour leadership race, he announced its establishment in a speech at the People’s History Museum in Manchester on 29 June, three weeks before he became prime minister. Following the start of his term, the office was formally opened, and the National Economic Council met in Manchester. According to Burnham, No 10 North is supposed to be a “northern pole” to the “southern pole” in Westminster. As the former mayor of Greater Manchester, he had long been an advocate for greater power to local authorities. Burnham describes his political philosophy, “Manchesterism”, as placing decision-making and economic power closer to communities.

In substantive terms, No 10 North has taken over the England devolution strategy previously held by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, along with local economic growth policy from the Treasury.

The Re:State think tank, whose report set out what the office should look like, recommended a staff of around 300 within eighteen months and warned that the project would fail if it amounted to little more than a relocation of Whitehall desks. Critics, including Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch, have called No 10 North a “gimmick”. Whether the transfer of these functions amounts to a genuine shift in power or simply a relocation of the same machinery remains the central question.

Rising Independence Movements in the UK

The three movements below are on different timetables and have different levels of public support. What they share is a common political context. The same anti-establishment wave that brought Burnham to Downing Street has also lifted these parties. The rise of Farage’s Reform UK has not only disrupted Westminster politics, but it has also created a broader atmosphere in which challenging the existing order feels possible. In addition to this, these three movements share an ideological stance. They are all centre-left parties. The rise of far-right movements is a fact in Europe, but one should also see the rise of anti-establishment left-wing and nationalist movements across the continent. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are part of this broader pattern, not exceptions to it.

Scotland

In Scotland, the SNP has been forming governments since 2007. The country held an independence referendum in September 2014, with 55% voting to remain in the union. The May 2026 Scottish Parliament elections strengthened the pro-independence bloc further: the SNP won 58 seats, and the Scottish Greens won 15, their best-ever result, giving pro-independence parties 73 of the 129 seats in Holyrood. Independence supporters have pointed to this result as the strongest democratic mandate yet for revisiting the question.

Reform UK, which has surged elsewhere in the UK, entered Holyrood for the first time with 17 members, yet all of its seats came through the regional list rather than direct constituency contests, suggesting that while the party has broad enough support to earn proportional seats, it is not strong enough in any single area to beat rivals head-to-head. Compared to other parts of the country, it also captured a smaller share of the anti-establishment vote in Scotland, where the SNP remained the dominant force with 58 seats, while Reform tied with Labour in second place.

Following the Brexit referendum, in which Scots voted 62% in favour of remaining in the EU, Scotland nonetheless found itself outside the European Union. This divergence between Scottish and English votes fuelled a significant shift in independence sentiment. The SNP’s push for a second independence referendum hit a legal barrier in 2022, when the UK Supreme Court ruled that the Scottish Parliament cannot legislate for one without Westminster’s consent, a consent that successive governments have refused to grant. According to the Institute for Government, polls on Scottish independence are averaging 50% as of April 2026.

SNP Member of Parliament Lara Bird has argued that Burnham’s pro-devolution politics does not address the structural problems Scots are facing and would not advance the Scottish independence cause, adding to the friction already visible at Westminster. Labour MP and Secretary of State for Scotland Douglas Alexander replied directly to Bird in the Commons, arguing that Burnham’s devolutionary agenda does address Scotland’s economic needs and that independence would introduce new instability rather than resolve existing problems.

Scotland may present the hardest case for Burnham, given rising support for independence. While Downing Street has argued that devolution could help re-industrialise the UK, a referendum could shift focus away from economic growth. From the Scottish perspective, meanwhile, greater devolution would serve as a demonstration of Scotland’s ability to manage its own affairs.

Wales

In Wales, a new government was elected earlier this year. Following the elections, Plaid Cymru, a Welsh nationalist centre-left party, formed a minority government. Interestingly, Reform UK trailed Plaid Cymru by just 9 seats in the Welsh Senedd, making it the main opposition party. The rise of anti-establishment parties in Wales interrupted Labour’s long-standing dominance.

The Plaid Cymru government announced before the election that there would be no referendum on independence during its first term, promising to tackle the nation’s main problems instead. The logic behind this caution can be seen in Welsh public opinion on independence. Support for Welsh independence has historically been lower than in Scotland or Northern Ireland. Refraining from a referendum in the first term shows that this is a long-term plan as well as a pragmatic one.

Wales may be the most promising case for Burnham’s devolution plans. Labour had dominated Welsh politics for decades, but its recent loss to Plaid Cymru signals a growing appetite for change. If Burnham can offer meaningful devolution, Labour could get back into power by addressing the same anti-establishment and nationalist sentiment that drove voters away.

Northern Ireland

Unlike the other two nations, Northern Ireland is not seeking independence but rather unification with the Republic of Ireland. Under the Good Friday Agreement’s mandatory power-sharing system, nationalists and unionists share executive power through the co-equal offices of First Minister and Deputy First Minister. Sinn Féin has held the office of First Minister since 2024, with the DUP’s Emma Little-Pengelly serving as Deputy First Minister, a reversal of the previous arrangement, in which Sinn Féin had held the deputy post.

According to Reuters, Northern Ireland’s First Minister Michelle O’Neill said that the election results in Scotland and Wales are a “moment of seismic change”, showing that rule from London is being threatened. However, DUP leader Emma Little-Pengelly has pushed back, arguing that those election results do not reflect a genuine public desire for constitutional change.

Under the Good Friday Agreement, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is obliged to call a border poll if it appears likely that a majority would vote for Irish unity, a threshold that successive UK governments have declined to recognise as having been reached. Polling on the question varies significantly depending on how it is framed, but most surveys continue to show a majority in Northern Ireland in favour of remaining in the UK.

In Northern Ireland, devolution is not the result of Burnham’s offerings but an obligation under the Good Friday Agreement. The constitutional trigger sits with Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State, rather than directly with Downing Street.

What to Expect?

Further devolution and several nationalist parties governing parts of the UK could place additional strain on the union. There are two main theories about how this plays out. The first is devolution as a pressure valve. Giving more powers to local authorities and nations could reduce the urgency of independence movements and relieve Westminster of political pressure, allowing London to focus on broader national and international matters. The second, opposing view is that devolution normalises self-governance. By demonstrating that nations and regions can manage their own affairs effectively, it may ultimately undermine the case for Westminster’s authority altogether, not with a bang but gradually.

Burnham himself stated in Glasgow, ahead of the Commonwealth Games and during a meeting with Scottish First Minister John Swinney, that an independence referendum is “off-limits”.

The uncertainty in all this is precisely what Burnham’s government must take seriously. A possible break in the UK, however distant it may seem, could be closer than it appears. Addressing the real concerns of people across the UK is not separate from answering the constitutional questions raised by the Irish, Scottish and Welsh. It is the same challenge. A genuine redistribution of political and economic power is what the Burnham government will need to deliver. At the same time, for independence movements to succeed, they will need to build solid majority public support for change. In Scotland, one of the strongest arguments for independence has been the competence of the devolved government in managing the powers it already holds. The promise of EU membership, which an independent Scotland could pursue, remains a powerful part of the independence prospectus, directly exploiting the wound that Brexit left on Scottish politics. Whether that promise, or Burnham’s devolutionary bet, proves more compelling to voters will shape the future of the UK.

Sources

BBC News (n.d.) Burnham tells Swinney independence is ‘off limits’ at Commonwealth Games meeting, Craig Williams. Available at: https://bbc.com/news/articles/c8xnq7qyr7ro

Bloom, D. (n.d.) Burnham will divert ‘significant’ resources out of civil service, says No. 10 North chief, Politico EU. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/burnham-will-divert-significant-resources-out-of-civil-service-says-no-10-north-chief/

Burnham, A. (2026) It’s not just a No 10 in the north, it’s an engine for growth throughout the whole UK, The Guardian, 23 July. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/23/number-10-north-growth-uk-andy-burnham

Kaye, S. (2026) Building No 10 North, Plan for Government series, Re:State Trust, July. Available at: https://re-state.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Building-No-10-North.pdf

Macaskill, A., Piper, E. and Ferguson, A. (2026) A divided kingdom: pro-independence parties surge across Britain, Reuters, 8 May. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/divided-kingdom-pro-independence-parties-surge-across-britain-2026-05-08/

Paun, A., Sargeant, J., Henderson, D., Allen, B. and Isaac, M. (2024) Scottish independence, Institute for Government, 18 September (last updated 29 May 2026). Available at: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/scottish-independence

UK Cabinet Office (n.d.) Devolution: Factsheet. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/691afaec84a267da57d705ab/Devolution_factsheet.pdf

Editors: Hasan H. Karamuk and Göktuğ Orhan (Sky)

Cover photo by Kristina Gadeikyte Gancarz on Unsplash.